Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy by Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2009-08
Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a
New Keynesian Economy
Campbell Leith
University of Glasgow
Simon Wren-Lewis
University of Oxford
www.sire.ac.uk
Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a
New Keynesian Economy
Campbell Leith∗
University of Glasgow
Simon Wren-Lewis
University of Oxford
First Draft - May 2008
This Draft - February 2009
Abstract: Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New
Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy
makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate
literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where
there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In
this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New
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terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy
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policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price
economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker
utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and
influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias,
implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a
sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias
this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a
sticky-price environment, can significantly raise the costs of having a less than
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1 Overview
There has been a wealth of recent work deriving optimal monetary policy util-
ising New Keynesian models. Such models introduce a stabilisation role for
monetary policy by assuming a nominal friction, often in the form of overlap-
ping price contracts of the Calvo (1983) type. However, such models usually
only introduce fiscal policy as a convenient device through which to ensure the
steady-state is eﬃcient, ignoring the impact of monetary policy on the gov-
ernment’s finances. Recent papers which relax this assumption by introducing
distortionary taxes include Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004), where they examine optimal monetary and fiscal policies un-
der commitment and assess the extent to which ignoring the fiscal consequences
of monetary policy aﬀects the usual description of optimal monetary policy. A
key result from this literature is that, under commitment, the steady-state level
of debt should follow a random walk - in an economy subject to nominal iner-
tia, the cost of undoing the fiscal consequences of shocks outweighs the benefits
of doing so. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) extend this analysis to the case of
multiple fiscal policy instruments and discretionary policy making. They find
that the need for policy to be time-consistent will imply that policy makers do
oﬀset the fiscal consequences of shocks, and that this ‘debt stabilisation bias’
can be particularly damaging in welfare terms.
While this literature has made the description of fiscal policy richer, the
assumption that the policy maker is infinitely lived and seeks to maximise social
welfare hides much of the interesting political game play highlighted by the
New Political Economy literature. In particular, the existence of an electoral
cycle and partisan politicians could reasonably be expected to influence policy
setting in ways which may overturn the desirability of using fiscal policy as a
stabilisation device when it is under the control of an infinitely lived benevolent
policy maker.
To explore this possibility we extend the model of Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2006) in which consumers supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms who
are only able to change prices at random intervals of time. Workers’ labour
income is taxed and the policy maker can choose tax rates, levels of government
spending and interest rates to maximise their objectives. We then assume that
households can be split into two types, according to their preferences for two
baskets of government expenditure. Probabilistic voting as in Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987) then implies that there can be random, but endogenous, shifts
in the median voter resulting in election of parties representing one or other of
the two groups. When in power a particular party will seek to implement policy
which maximises the welfare of their electoral base, but in doing so will consider
the influence their actions have on the policies adopted by the other party should
they happen to be elected in the future. They can influence these actions by
aﬀecting the stock of debt inherited by the other party in the future, as well
as influencing the chances of electoral success. Therefore the political economy
elements we add encompass those of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Persson and
Svensson (1989) and Aghion and Bolton (1990).
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There are a number of papers building on this earlier literature and exploring
time-consistent fiscal policy in a setting where there is political conflict. This
often takes place in the context of real models featuring distributional conflict
in an overlapping generations framework (see, for example, Song et al (2007)
and Hassler et al. (2005)), or a heterogeneous initial wealth distribution in a
neoclassical growth model (Krusell et al. (1997)). Debertoli and Nunes (2007)
explore the impact on government debt of exogenous political turnover in a real
infinite horizon model with endogenous government spending.
In contrast our model is an infinite-horizon sticky-price New Keynesian econ-
omy with nominal government debt where policy makers utilise monetary and
fiscal policy instruments (tax and spending policy are endogenous) to max-
imise their micro-founded objectives in the context of an electoral game with
an endogenous voting mechanism The introduction of sticky prices to a general
equilibrium model of political conflict is crucial in three respects. Firstly, in the
absence of sticky-prices it is costless to use a surprise inflation to deflate the
real value of nominal debt, (see Lucas and Stokey (1983)) and nominal debt
could not be used strategically as a state variable. Secondly, the introduction
of sticky prices implies that policy makers will trade-oﬀ the use of instruments
for business cycle stabilisation purposes against the strategic use of policy to
both tie the hands of their political opponents and influence the endogenous
outcome of future elections. Thirdly, any movement in policy instruments for
strategic reasons will have repercussions on other welfare-relevant endogenous
variables, particularly inflation, in a sticky-price economy, and this will aﬀect
the game-play between the political opponents.
We find that the combination of sticky prices, nominal debt, political hetero-
geneity and an electoral cycle gives rise to a deficit bias which typically pushes
the desired level of debt significantly above its eﬃcient level. Debt is raised
as an incumbent party wishes to tie the hands of future governments who may
not share its preferences - this leads to a suboptimally low level of government
spending. In a sticky price environment, it also tends to imply a negative infla-
tion bias, as, otherwise, incumbent parties would wish to use negative inflation
shocks to further increase the real value of debt to tie the hands of their oppo-
nents further. Given the spillovers from policy instruments to other variables in
our New Keynesian economy, the policy mix used to achieve the policy maker’s
strategic objectives depends crucially on the degree of price stickiness.
Finally we assess the welfare costs of electoral shocks relative to more stan-
dard shocks (technology and cost push shocks) and find that the biases intro-
duced by considering realistic relaxations in the assumptions that policy makers
are fully benevolent are significantly more costly than the costs of standard shock
processes in the benchmark New Keynesian model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline our model in
which households supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms who are only
able to change prices at random intervals of time. Workers’ labour income
is taxed. Households are split into two groups with diﬀerent preferences for
the composition and/or size of government spending. In Section 3 we derive a
second-order approximation to welfare for these consumers and contrast that
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with social welfare. In Section 4, we describe the nature of the electoral game
and optimal time-consistent policy in the face of this electoral uncertainty, where
political parties represent the interests of one of the two types of household.
This then informs the simulation results in section 5, which reveal that political
parties operating in a New Keynesian economy, facing electoral uncertainty and
constrained to be time consistent in their policy actions, will suboptimally raise
the level of debt to tie the hands of their opponents and influence the outcome
of the electoral game.
2 The Model
This section outlines our economy. Excluding the political economy aspects of
our analysis1 , the model is a standard New Keynesian model, but augmented
to include the government’s budget constraint where government spending is fi-
nanced by distortionary taxation and/or borrowing. This basic set-up is similar
to that in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
but with some diﬀerences. Firstly, we split government spending into two types
and allow policy makers to vary such spending in a way which they find op-
timal, rather than simply treating government spending as an exogenous flow
which must be financed. Secondly, we allow for probabilistic voting (Lindbeck
and Weibull, 1987) which leads to endogenous fluctuations in the median voter
such that political parties representing two types of consumer preferences over
government spending alternate in power. This gives rise to the possibility of
policy makers using debt strategically, and the generation of electorally driven
economic fluctuations. We examine the households’ problem initially, before
turning to the firms’ problem.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one. However, the households
split evenly into two types depending on their tastes for government spending.
We shall assume full asset markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will
face the same budget constraint. As a result the typical household will seek to
maximise the following objective function,
E0
∞X
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt, GAt ;G
B
t ) (1)
where C,GA, GB and N are a consumption aggregate, two types of public goods
aggregate, and labour supply respectively.
The consumption aggregate is defined as2
C = (
Z 1
0
C(j)
−1
 dj)

−1 (2)
1Section 4 below, describes the political aspects of the policy problem.
2We drop the time subscript when all variables in an expression are dated in the same
period and there is no possibility of confusion.
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where j denotes the good’s type or variety. The public goods aggregates take
the same form3
GA = (
Z 1
0
GA(j)
−1
 dj)

−1 , and,
GB = (
Z 1
0
GB(j)
−1
 dj)

−1
The elasticity of substitution between varieties t > 1 is assumed to time varying
as we wish to allow for iid cost-push/mark-up shocks.
The budget constraint at time t is given byZ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj +Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt +Dt +WtNt(1− τ t)− Tt
where Pt(j) is the price of variety j , Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio
held at the end of period t, Π is the representative household’s share of profits
in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, τ is an wage income tax
rate, and T are lump sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one
period ahead pay-oﬀs.
Households must first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimises the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure
for any individual good implies the demand function given below,
C(j) = (
P (j)
P
)−C
where we have a price index given by
P = (
Z 1
0
P (j)1−dj)
1
1−
The budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
PtCt +Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Dt +WtNt(1− τ t)− Tt (3)
where
R 1
0
P (j)C(j)dj = PC.
2.1.1 Households’ Intertemporal Consumption Problem
The first of the households intertemporal problems involves allocating consump-
tion expenditure across time. For tractability assume that (1) takes the specific
3The assumption that private and public consumption baskets take the same form is com-
mon in the literature, since it makes aggregation of demand for individual firms’ products
across the private and public sectors straightforward. We make the same assumption in fur-
ther separating public consumption into two types for the same reason.
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form for household type i, i = 1, 2.
E0
∞X
t=0
βt(
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
A
i
(GAt )1−σ
1− σ + χ
B
i
(GBt )1−σ
1− σ −
Nt1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
) (4)
It is diﬀerences in the χAi and χ
B
i parameters that will be the source of political
conflict to the extent that these diﬀer across the two household types and the
two parties that represent them. We leave the exact nature of that heterogeneity
unspecified such that we can consider diﬀerences in preferences over the compo-
sition of government spending as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990) or government
size as in Persson and Svennson (1989).
We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (3) to obtain
the optimal allocation of consumption across time,
β(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ(
Pt
Pt+1
) = Qt,t+1
Taking conditional expectations on both sides and rearranging gives
βRtEt{( CtCt+1 )
σ(
Pt
Pt+1
)} = 1 (5)
where Rt = 1Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
oﬀ a unit of currency in t+ 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation
which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time
such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after
allowing for tilting due to interest rates diﬀering from the households’ rate of
time preference).
A log-linearised version of (5) can be written as
bCt = Et{ bCt+1}− 1σ (rt −Et{πt+1}) (6)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady-state, rt =
Rt − ρ where ρ = 1β − 1, and πt = pt − pt−1 is price inflation.
The second foc relates to their labour supply decision and is given by,
(1− τ)
µ
W
P
¶
= NϕCσ
Log-linearising implies,
− τ
1− τ bτ + bw = ϕ bN + σ bC
2.2 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising
total costs,
R 1
0
P (j)(GA(j) +GB(j))dj. Given the form of the baskets of public
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goods this implies,
GA(j) = (
P (j)
P
)−GA
GB(j) = (
P (j)
P
)−GB
G = GA +GB
2.3 Firms
The production function is linear, so for firm j
Y (j) = AN(j) (7)
where a = ln(A) is time varying and stochastic. While the demand curve they
face is given by,
Y (j) = (
P (j)
P
)−Y
where Y =
hR 1
0
Y (j)
−1
 dj
i 
−1
. The objective function of the firm is given by,
∞X
s=0
(θp)sQt,t+s
∙
P (j)t
Pt+s
Y (j)t+s −
Wt+s
Pt+s
Y (j)t+s(1− κ)
A
¸
(8)
where θp is the probability that the firm is unable to change its price in a partic-
ular period and κ is a time-invariant employment subsidy which can be used to
eliminate the steady-state distortion associated with monopolistic competition
and distortionary income taxes. Profit maximisation then implies that firms
that are able to change price in period t will select the following price,
P ∗t =
P∞
s=0(θp)
sQt,t+s
h
t
Wt+s
Pt+s
P tt+s
Yt+s
At+s
i
P∞
s=0(θp)sQt,t+s
£
(t − 1)P−1t+sP tt+sYt+s(1− κ)
¤
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) demonstrate that log-linearisation of this pricing
behaviour implies a New Keynesian Phillips curve for price inflation which is
given by,
πt = βEtπt+1 + λ(cmct + bμt)
where λ = (1−θpβ)(1−θp)θp , cmc = −a+ bw are the real log-linearised marginal costs
of production, and bμt = ln( tt−1)− ln( −1) is a mark-up shock representing the
temporary deviation of the desired mark-up from its steady-state value.
2.4 Equilibrium
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j,
Y (j) = C(j) +GA(j) +GB(j) (9)
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which allows us to write,
Y = C +G
where aggregate output is defined as, Y = [
R 1
0
Y (j)
t−1
t dj]
t
t−1 . Log-linearising
implies
bY = θ bC + (1− θ) bGbG = γ bGA + (1− γ) bGB
where we define θ = C
Y
and γ = GA
G
. These steady-state shares will be related
to deeper preference parameters below.
2.5 Government Budget Constraint
Combining the series of the representative consumer’s flow budget constraints,
(3), with borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi-schemes, gives the intertem-
poral budget constraint (see Woodford, 2003, chapter 2, page 69),
∞X
T=t
Et[PTCT ] ≤ Dt +
∞X
T=t
Et[Qt,T (ΠT +WTNT (1− τT )− TT )]
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PY =WN +Π− κWN
and the definition of aggregate demand, we can rewrite the private sector’s
budget constraint as,
Dt = −
∞X
T=t
Et[Qt,T (PTGT −WTNT (τT − κ)− TT )]
In order to focus on any deficit bias and time-inconsistency problems asso-
ciated with the introduction of electoral uncertainty in a New Keynesian model
with debt and distortionary taxation we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and later authors and introduce a steady-state subsidy. This subsidy oﬀsets, in
a benchmark steady-state, the distortions caused by distortionary taxation and
imperfect competition in price setting, and removes the usual desire on the part
of policy makers to raise output above its natural level to compensate for these
distortions. In other words, this subsidy ensures that our benchmark steady
state is eﬃcient, such that any desire to deviate from that steady-state is solely
being driven by the biases and distortions caused by heterogeneity in preferences
over government spending and the electoral cycle. The steady state subsidy is
financed by lump-sum taxation.4 We shall assume that both the level of the
4An alternative means of ensuring the steady-state was eﬃcient with a positive stock of
government debt, but without recourse to a lump sum tax would be to allow the policy maker
to apply a time invariant distortionary tax to leisure - see, for example, Bilbiie et al (2008).
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subsidy and the associated level of lump-sum taxation cannot be altered from
this steady state level, so that any changes in the government’s budget con-
straint have to be financed by changes in distortionary taxation or government
spending. This implies thatWTNTκ = TT in our economy at all points in time,
allowing us to simplify the budget constraint to,
Dt = −
∞X
T=t
Et[Qt,T (PTGT −WTNT τT )]
i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service
government debt as well as stabilise the economy. Rewriting in real terms and
noting that government debt is dated at the beginning of the period,
Bt
Pt−1
Pt−1
Pt
=
∞X
T=t
Et[βT−t(
Ct
CT
)σ(wTNT τT −GT )]
where real debt is defined as, bt ≡ BtPt−1 and its initial steady-state is given by,
b =
wNτ −G
1− β
Log-linearising around this steady-state,bbt − πt − σ( bCt) = βbbt+1 −Et{πt+1 + σ bCt+1} (10)
+[−σ(1− β)( bCt) + wNτ
b
( bwt + bNt + bτ t)− G
b
bGt]
Appendix 1 defines the steady-state ratios contained in this log-linearisation as
a function of model parameters and the initial steady-state debt-GDP ratio.
3 Policy Makers’ Objectives
In order to derive a objective functions for policy analysis we proceed in the
following manner. Firstly, we consider the social planner’s problem. We then
contrast this with the outcome under flexible prices in order to determine the
level of the steady-state subsidy required to ensure the model’s initial steady-
state is socially optimal when the government implements a plan for government
expenditure consistent with that chosen by the social planner. We then con-
struct a quadratic approximation to utility in our sticky-price/distortionary tax
economy which assesses the extent to which endogenous variables diﬀer from the
eﬃcient equilibrium due to the nominal inertia, tax distortions and electoral un-
certainty present in the model. We contrast this social objective function with
the objective function adopted by either policy maker when they represent their
constituencies. This will imply that a given policy maker has a diﬀerent tar-
get for each expenditure gap and that the weight attached to that target diﬀers
across policy makers. Finally, we recast our model in terms of the ‘gap’ variables
contained within our social welfare metric.
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3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner is not constrained by the price mechanism and simply max-
imises the average of the two households’ utilities, (4), subject to the technology,
(7), and resource constraints, (9). Therefore the social planner’s objective func-
tion is given by,
(
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
A (G
A
t )
1−σ
1− σ + χ
B (G
B
t )
1−σ
1− σ −
Nt1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
) (11)
where χA = 12(χ
A
i + χ
A
j ) and χ
B = 12(χ
B
i + χ
B
j ) are the average household
preference weights attached to the two types of government spending basket.
This yields the following first order conditions,
(C∗t )
−σ =
1
2
(χAi + χ
A
j )(G
A∗
t )
−σ
(C∗t )
−σ =
1
2
(χBi + χ
B
j )(G
B∗
t )
−σ
(C∗t )
−σ − Y ∗ϕt A
−(1+ϕ)
t = 0
where we introduce the ‘*’ superscript to denote the eﬃcient level of that vari-
able. These can be log-linearised around the deterministic eﬃcient steady-state,
and given the national accounting identity we obtain,
bY ∗t = ( 1 + ϕσ + ϕ)at
and, bY ∗t = bC∗t = bG∗t = bGA∗t = bGB∗t
3.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Appendix 1 derives the subsidy, κ, required for the flexible price equilibrium to
reproduce the eﬃcient steady state. If any government implements its spending
plans in line with the social planner’s problem in steady-state then the flex price
steady-state conditional on the initial fiscal position is the same as the eﬃcient
output level. Appendix 1 also defines the steady-state ratios contained in the
log-linearised budget constraint, (10), as a function of model parameters and
the initial steady-state debt-GDP ratio.
3.3 Social Welfare
Appendix 1(2) derives the quadratic approximation to utility
Γ = −N1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{σθ( bCt − bC∗t )2 + σ(1− θ)γ( bGAt − bGA∗t )2
+σ(1− θ)(1− γ)( bGAt − bGA∗t )2 + ϕ(bYt − bY ∗t )2 + λπ2t}+ tip+O[2]
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where tip refers to ’terms independent of policy’ and O[2] captures terms of
order greater than 2. It contains quadratic terms in price inflation reflecting the
costs of price dispersion induced by inflation in the presence of nominal inertia,
as well as terms in the consumption, government spending and output gaps i.e.
the diﬀerence between the actual value of the variable and its optimal value.
The weights attached to each element are a function of deep model parameters.
However, we wish to consider how policy is aﬀected by political parties hav-
ing welfare functions which diﬀer from the social optimum due to heterogeneity
in preferences over government spending. Therefore, we need to define the
equivalent welfare measures adopted by our political parties when they solely
represent the interests of one of the two types of household present in our econ-
omy. The diﬀerence between social welfare and the objective function adopted
by party i is given by,
Γi = Γ+ (χAi − χA)(G
A
)1−σ
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{2 bGAt + (1− σ)( bGAt )2}
+(χBi − χB)(G
B
)1−σ
1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{2 bGBt + (1− σ)( bGBt )2}
where χA = χ
A
1 +χ
A
1
2 and, χ
B =
χB1 +χ
B
2
2 are the average weights across the two
household types. Using the steady-state relationship,
χA(G
A
)1−σ = N
1+ϕ
(1− θ)γ
χB(G
B
)1−σ = N
1+ϕ
(1− θ)(1− γ)
this can be rewritten as,
Γi = −
1
2
N
1+ϕ
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{σθ( bCt − bC∗t )2 +ΩAi ( bGAt − bGA∗t − bGATit )2
+ΩBi ( bGBt − bGB∗t − bGBTit )2 + ϕ(bYt − bY ∗t )2 + γ π2t} (12)
where ΩAi = (1−θ)γ(σ−
χAi −χA
χA (1−σ)) and ΩBi = (1−θ)(1−γ)(σ−
χBi −χB
χB (1−σ))
are the transformed weights on the government spending gaps for policy maker
i and,
bGATit = (χAi − χA)χA − χAi (1− σ) + (χ
A
i − χA)(1− σ)
χA − χAi (1− σ)
bGA∗t
bGBTit = (χBi − χB)χB − χBi (1− σ) + (χ
B
i − χB)(1− σ)
χB − χBi (1− σ)
bGB∗t
are the policy maker specific targets. They reflect a preference driven constant
desire to move away from the socially optimal level of spending as well as an
element reflecting the desire to alter that target in the face of shocks.
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Since these party specific targets will drive the incentives facing governments
to utilise debt strategically it is helpful to explore how diﬀerent types of hetero-
geneity aﬀect these targets. Assume that χA = χB so that the social planner
would choose the same level of spending of each basket of goods, implying
γ = 1/2, and that these average taste parameters are held constant. Consider
the constant elements first, which capture the desire to deviate from the socially
optimal government spending plan in the absence of shocks. If we introduce a
symmetrical composition heterogeneity in party tastes then χA1 −χA = χA−χA2
> 0 and χB2 − χB = χB − χB1 > 0. That is party 1 prefers basket A to basket
B and party 2 prefers the opposite. This implies the following inequalities,
(χAi − χA)
χA − χAi (1− σ)
< (>)− (χ
B
i − χB)
χB − χBi (1− σ)
when σ > (<)1, χAi − χA > 0 and χBi − χB < 0
In other words, when σ > 1 each party wishes to cut spending on its least
preferred basket by more than it wishes to increase spending on its preferred
basket, while when σ < 1 the opposite is true. The σ parameter is identical to
the concavity index, −HGG(G)/(HG(G))2 for each government spending util-
ity felicity, H(G) = (Gt)
1−σ
1−σ . A value of σ > 1 implies that the concavity of
the felicity is increasing in G, such that the diﬀerent government consumption
baskets become greater substitutes as the overall level of spending is increased.
Accordingly, parties implement more similar policies when resources are scarce,
and indulge in political conflict when resources are abundant. Therefore, when
σ > 1 we find a general desire to reduce government spending and achieve a
minimal provision of both types of government spending. This drives the deficit
bias we shall observe below. Persson and Tabellini (2000) find that a similar
condition emerges in the analysis of a variety of political conflicts.
Similarly when we consider a size heterogeneity such that χA1 −χA = χA−χA2
> 0 and χB1 − χB = χB − χB2 > 0, then the following results hold,
(χC1 − χC)
χC − χC1 (1− σ)
< (>)− (χ
C
2 − χC)
χC − χC2 (1− σ)
when σ > (<)1 where C = A,B
This implies that the party preferring ‘small’ government wishes to cut spending
by more than the ‘large’ government party wishes to increase it whenever σ > 1.
Finally, the desired response to shocks is also aﬀected by any heterogeneity,
such that,
(χCi − χC)(1− σ)
χC − χCi (1− σ)
< (>)0 when σ > 1, χCi > (<)χ
C and C = A,B
and, when σ > 1, parties utilise their least preferred instruments to respond to
shocks.
It is helpful to rewrite the per-period loss function for party i in the following
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form before computing the time consistent solution to the policy problem,
σθ( bCit − bC∗t )2 +ΩAi ( bGAit − bGA∗t − bGATit )2 +ΩBi ( bGBit − bGB∗t − bGBTit )2
+ϕ(bY it − bY ∗t )2 + γ (πit)2 + tip
= πitRπ
i
t + (u
i
t − ui∗t )0Qi(uit − ui∗t ) + tip+O[2]
where R =
h ε
λ
i
and Qi =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0
0 ZCi Z
CA
i Z
CB
i
0 0 ZAi Z
AB
i
0 0 0 ZBi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
ZCi = σθ + ϕθ
2
ZAi = Ω
A
i + ϕ(1− θ)2γ2
ZBi = Ω
B
i + ϕ(1− θ)2(1− γ)2
ZCAi = 2ϕθ(1− θ)γ
ZCBi = 2ϕθ(1− θ)(1− γ)
ZABi = 2ϕ(1− θ)2γ(1− γ)
and the vector of controls and targets are given by,
uit =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bτ it − bτ∗tbCit − bC∗tbGAit − bGA∗tbGBit − bGB∗t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ and u
i∗
t = u
i∗ +K1iSt−1 +K3
iξt
where ui∗, K1i and K3i are defined in Appendix 2(1).
3.4 Gap variables
We have derived welfare based on various gaps, so we now proceed to rewrite
our model in terms of the same gap variables to facilitate derivation of optimal
policy. The consumption Euler equation can be written in gap form as,
( bCt − bC∗t ) = Et{( bCt+1 − bC∗t+1)}− 1σ ((rt − r∗t )−Et{πt+1})
where r∗t = σ
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ(Et{at+1}− at) is the natural/eﬃcient rate of interest. (This
comes from the fact that bC∗t = bY ∗t and the definition of the eﬃcient level of
output).
While the NKPC can be written in gap form as,
πt = βEtπt+1 + λ(ϕ(bYt − bY ∗t ) + σ( bCt − bC∗t ) + τ1− τ (bτ t − bτ∗t ))
where, following Benigno and Woodford (2003) we define, τ1−τ bτ∗t = bμt . In other
words we are defining our ‘eﬃcient’ tax rate as the tax rate required to perfectly
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oﬀset the impact of a cost-push shock.5 If we had access to a lump-sum tax to
finance the budget deficit then this would be the optimal tax rate. However,
given the need to finance the government liabilities through distortionary tax-
ation, actual tax rates are likely to deviate from the level required to perfectly
oﬀset shocks. Appendix 1 rewrites the budget constraint in gap form as,bbt−πt−σ( bCt− bC∗t ) = βbbt+1−βEt{πt+1+σ( bCt+1− bC∗t+1)}+pst−ft−σ(1−β)( bCt− bC∗t )
with the primary surplus defined as,
pst =
wNτ
b
[(1+ϕ)(bYt− bY ∗t )+ 11− τ (bτ t−bτ∗t )+σ( bCt− bC∗t )]−Gb ( bGt− bG∗t ) (13)
and
ft = −(σ(1− βρa) + (1− σ)(1− β))
(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
at −
wN
b
bμt
capturing the extent to which the various shocks hitting our model have fiscal
consequences. Also recall the composition of government spending,bGt − bG∗t = γ( bGAt − bGA∗t ) + (1− γ)( bGBt − bGB∗t )
4 The Electoral Game and Time Consistent Pol-
icy
We now examine the time-consistent solution to the policy problem under elec-
toral uncertainty. We assume that elections occur after a random interval of
time, such that the probability of observing an election in a given time period is
a constant, e. This is diﬀerent from most of the literature which assumes that
there is an election in every period. There are several reasons why we allow
for a random election probability. The first is that we have developed a sticky-
price business cycle model where the natural interpretation of a time period is
one quarter year, and it is clearly unrealistic to assume that elections occur at
this frequency. Secondly, adopting an election probability rather than assuming
fixed term elections is more tractable. Under the assumption that there is a
constant probability of facing an election, economic agents forecasts of future
economic policies will be conditional on who happens to be the incumbent. If
we were to adopt a fixed term election structure, economic agents forecasts of
the future would not only be conditional on who was incumbent, but also on
how many periods we were from the next election.
Accordingly, we can define the probability of party i being in power in the
next period as follows,
q(i | j)t = eq(i)t for i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2
q(i | i)t = (1− e) + eq(i)t for i = 1, 2
5 It should be noted that we could define the tax ‘gap’ as being the actual tax rate relative
to any benchmark tax rate we choose, such as, for example, the initial steady-state tax rate.
However, it is convenient to define the gap relative to the tax rate which oﬀsets the impact of
a cost-push shock on inflation.
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where q(i | j)t reflects the probability of party i obtaining power, given that
party j is the current incumbent, and q(i | i)t gives the probability of party i
obtaining power given that i is incumbent. Since there is not an election every
period, there is a clear advantage from being in power. q(i)t then captures
the probability that, given an election has been called in period t, party i wins
that election. q(j)t = 1 − q(i)t is the complementary probability that party
j wins the election. These election victory probabilities shall be endogenously
determined through a process of probabilistic voting which shall be outlined
below. However, it is worth noting that the numerical simulations conducted
below reveal that the quantitative importance of the endogeneity of electoral
success is relatively small, and that the main mechanisms operating within the
model can also be understood by assuming a constant exogenous value for q(i)t.
Before detailing the probabilistic voting mechanism it is helpful to outline the
policy problem facing policy maker i.
Policymaker i’s policy problem can be described as follows,
V i(St−1; ξt) =Min
uit
(πitRπ
i
t + (u
i
t −ui∗t )0Qi(uit −ui∗t ) + βEtCi(Sit; ξt+1)) (14)
subject to,
πit = C0
i +C1iSt−1 +C2
iuit +C3
iξt
Sit = D0
i +D1iSt−1 +D2
iuit +D3
iξt
where CJi and DJi,with J = 1, 2, 3, are the coeﬃcient matrices defined in
Appendix 2 after exploiting the linear-quadratic form of the problem to elimi-
nate expectations. The i superscript denotes who is the incumbent. Aside from
aﬀecting the choice of control variables, uit, the coeﬃcient matrices are also in-
dexed by i since who is incumbent aﬀects economic agents’ forecasts of the future
and these forecasts are embedded in the coeﬃcient matrices. St−1 =
⎡
⎣
bbt
at−1
μt−1
⎤
⎦
, uit =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bτ it − bτ∗tbCit − bC∗tbGAit − bGA∗tbGBit − bGB∗t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ and u
i∗
t = u
i∗+KiSt = ui∗+K1iSt−1+K3iξt are the
vectors of state, control and policy maker specific target variables respectively,
while ξt is a vector of iid innovations to the model’s shock processes.
The value of the continuation game depends on whether or not party i is
re-elected in the next period,
EtCi(Sit; ξt+1) = q(i | i)t+1EtV i(Sit; ξt+1) + q(j | i)t+1EtW i(Sit; ξt+1)
where the expected pay-oﬀs when party i is out of power are given by,
W i(St−1; ξt) = π
j
tRπ
j
t + (u
j
t − ui∗t )0Qi(u
j
t − ui∗t ) + βEtCi(S
j
t ; ξt+1)
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Note that the latter expression computes the flow benefits to party i given the
policies implemented by party j, and values the continuation game conditional on
the level of debt left by party j highlighting the scope for using debt strategically.
Further strategic considerations are introduced by endogenising the election
victory probability, q(i)t.
4.1 Voting Behaviour
Parties are assumed to represent the economic interests of the households they
represent. That is party i possesses an economic objective function which re-
flects the economic preferences of household i. However, in order to introduce
probabilistic voting behaviour, we also assume that individual members of an
particular household also care about other non-economic factors, such that for
individual k of household i they receive a reduction in losses of (σik + δ) when
party 1 is elected, and zero otherwise. σik is a zero mean random variable uni-
formly distributed with density Ψi, i = 1, 2. δ is also uniformly distributed with
mean 0 and density Λ.
The timing of events is repetitive and can be summarised as in Figure 1,
beginning from the point at which economic agents form their expectations of
the next period, t, conditional on knowing who is incumbent and the policies
they have implemented in period t-1. We then enter period t and there is a draw
from the distribution which determines whether or not there will be an election.
Upon that signal being positive, with probability e, there is a draw of the voter
preference shocks which aﬀects the outcome of the probabilistic voting, namely
the general preference towards party i across all voters, δ, and the individual
specific preferences towards party 1 of voters of households 1 and 2, respectively,
σik . These preference parameters remain in place until there is another signal
to hold an election. Accordingly, (σ
ik+δ)
1−β(1−e)captures the expected discounted
non-economic benefit to voter k of household i of party 1 winning the election.
Since these variables are redrawn at each election, their expected value prior
to an election is zero. Therefore, even if a particular draw of voter preference
shocks has meant that voters were very content to see party i elected, this will
not aﬀect future election outcomes and will not aﬀect incumbent behaviour.
Voters then decide how to vote, comparing the expected economic and non-
economic benefits of electing either party, such that voter k of household 1 will
vote for party 1 whenever,
Et−1V 1(St−1; ξt)−
(σ1k + δ)
1− β(1− e) < Et−1W
1(St−1; ξt)
In other words the voter compares the expected discounted losses associated
with party 1 being in power, Et−1V 1(St−1; ξt), after adjusting for the dis-
counted idiosyncratic, σ1k, and general, δ, non-economic benefits of party 1
being in power, with the losses he would experience if party 1 was out of power,
Et−1W 1(St−1; ξt). Since, the voting takes place prior to the realisation of the
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innovations to the economic shock processes in period t, the expected value of
these losses is based on information available at the end of period t-1.6
Given these trade-oﬀs facing voters, the swing voter of household 1 is defined
as,
σ1 = (1− β(1− e))
¡
Et−1V 1(St−1; ξt)−Et−1W 1(St−1; ξt)
¢
− δ
While the swing voter of household 2 is given by,
σ2 = (1− β(1− e))
¡
Et−1W 2(St−1; ξt)−Et−1V 2(St−1; ξt)
¢
− δ
As a result party 1’s vote share is given by,
v1 =
1
2
Ψ1(
1
2Ψ1
− σ1) + 1
2
Ψ2(
1
2Ψ2
− σ2)
The first element captures the votes from household 1 and the second from
household 2. Note that since δ is a random variable σ1 and σ2 are also random.
Party 1’s probability of winning becomes,
q(1)t = Pr[
1
2
Ψ1(
1
2Ψ1
− σ1) + 1
2
Ψ2(
1
2Ψ2
− σ2) > 1
2
]
= Pr[
21− β(1− e)
Ψ1 +Ψ2
µ
− 12Ψ1
¡
Et−1V 1(St−1; ξt)−Et−1W 1(St−1; ξt)
¢
− 12Ψ2
¡
Et−1W 2(St−1; ξt)−Et−1V 2(St−1; ξt)
¢ ¶ > δ]
=
1
2
− z1
¡
Et−1V 1(St−1; ξt)− Et−1W 1(St−1; ξt)
¢
+z2
¡
Et−1V 2(St−1; ξt)−Et−1W 2(St−1; ξt)
¢
where zi = Λ(1−β(1−e))Ψi+Ψj Ψ
i , i = 1, 2. Therefore the probability of winning the
election depends upon the expected relative costs to voters of their natural party
being out of power. As the expected losses of household i when party i is out
of power, Et−1W i(St−1; ξt), rise relative to the losses they expect to experience
when party i is in power, Et−1V i(St−1; ξt), fewer voters within household i will
be tempted to switch allegiance to party j for a given draw of voter preference
shocks. Furthermore, the weights attached to the diﬀerent expected losses when
a particular party is in or out of power, zi , are dependent upon the relative
densities of the voter preference shocks within each household, Ψi, i = 1, 2. As
the density is increased voters are more homogeneous within each household.
Therefore, when zi > zj , the voters within household i are more homogeneous
than those within household j. This implies that there are fewer swing voters in
household i and policy makers will find it relatively easy to tempt voters from
household j to switch allegiance to party i creating an electoral bias towards
party i, cet. par.
There are several diﬀerences between this set-up and that which would
emerge in the absence of electoral uncertainty and heterogeneity in preferences
6An alternative timing assumption would be to allow voters to observe period t’s economic
shocks prior to voting. This would not aﬀect the strategic behaviour of the policy maker in the
previous period, t-1, since he expects these shocks to be, on average, zero. However, it would
add additional volatility to the electoral outcome as economic shocks aﬀect voter choices.
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across households. Firstly, the heterogeneity gives rise to targets for control
variables which capture the desire to deviate from the socially optimal level of
such variables. Secondly, the value of the continuation game must take account
of the likely behaviour of one’s political rival to the extent that he/she is likely
to be elected. The possibility that one’s rival is elected and their behaviour
if elected are aﬀected by the actions of the incumbent policy maker since the
debt passed from one period to the next aﬀects the trade-oﬀs facing voters and
constrains the actions of any subsequent policy-maker. Debt can therefore be
used as a strategic tool to both aﬀect the likely outcome of elections and tie the
hands of future policy makers.
The solution proceeds by ‘guessing’ the form of the pay-oﬀs when each party
is in or out of power and using this to solve the policy problem conditional on
these undetermined coeﬃcients, as well as those involved in relating expectations
to state-variables. Substituting this solution into the model and the Bellman
equation allows us to solve for the undetermined coeﬃcients and complete the
description of policy for both parties. Full details of this procedure are given in
Appendix 3.7
5 Numerical Results
In this section we explore the nature of any biases introduced by heterogeneity
in party preferences over the composition and size of government spending in
the face of electoral uncertainty, as well as any macroeconomic fluctuations
induced by the electoral cycle. We conclude by comparing the welfare costs
of the biases and election-induced fluctuations with those arising from more
conventional shock processes (namely, technology and mark-up shocks).
Following the econometric estimates in Leith and Malley (2005) we adopt
the following parameter set, ϕ = 1, σ = 2, μ = 1.2,  = 6, β = 0.99. We
assume χA = χB = 4/9 which implies, in line with Gali (1994), that the share
of government consumption in GDP, 1 − θ = 0.25 and the optimal size of the
two government spending baskets is the same, γ = 1/2. In our benchmark
simulations we assume a degree of price stickiness of θp = 0.75, which implies
that an average contract length of one year, and an initial debt-GDP ratio
of 60%. However, we also explore the implications of alternative assumptions
regarding the degree of price stickiness below.
As noted above, our assumption that σ > 1 implies that the utility felicities
for private and public consumption are increasingly concave in their arguments,
and this is crucial in creating the incentives to move the economy towards a
7For the special case of e = 1 and z1 = z2 = 0, it is possible to solve the policy problem
analytically using the symbolic maths package Maple 10. Outside of this special case, the
policy problem is solved using the non-linear numerical solution algorithms of Matlab. When
applicable, both approaches yield the same results. Furthermore, solving the model without
conflict using these approaches yields identical results to the discretionary solution of the same
model using the Matlab code of Soderlind (1999).
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deficit bias. While this parameter can be diﬃcult to estimate using single equa-
tion instrumental variable approaches (see, for example, Yogo(2004)), in the
context of systems estimation of general equilibrium policy analysis models it
tends to have an estimated value in excess of one (an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution less than 1) since the impact of interest rate changes on output is
too great otherwise. For example, our assumed value of 2 is in line with GMM-
systems estimation of a New Keynesian description of the US and Euro-area
economies in Leith and Malley (2005) and the Bayesian posterior distributions
of Smets and Wouters (2005).
5.1 The Deficit Bias and the Electoral Cycle
We begin by considering the nature of the electoral cycle when parties diﬀer in
their preferences over the composition of government spending. Specifically, we
consider the following pattern of preferences, χA1 = χB2 =
5
9 and χ
A
2 = χB1 =
3
9
such that party 1 (2) prefers basket A (B) to basket B (A). Figure 2 details the
fluctuations in the economy in the absence of shocks other than electoral shocks.
This figure also assumes that the probability of election victory for party i is
exogenous, q(i), is 1/2 which implies that both parties will behave the same
in aggregate with only the composition of government spending varying across
parties. The solid blue line details the impulse response when, in expectation,
there is a four year electoral cycle, e = 1/16, and the dashed green line when
there is an election every quarter year, e = 1. In both cases, while there is a
clear saw-tooth pattern in the spending on the respective government spending
baskets as the party in power alternates, this does not induce any aggregate
fluctuations.8 However, there is a significant deficit bias and both parties will
raise debt above its eﬃcient level. The reason for this is that since σ > 1
each party wishes to cut expenditure on its least preferred basket by more than
it wishes to increase spending on its preferred basket. Therefore, each party
i wishes to issue more debt to tie the hands of its opponent party j (i 6= j)
and reduce their spending on party i’s least preferred basket, even although
this will reduce the spending on party i’s preferred basket too. The higher
debt is supported by both reduced government spending and higher taxes. The
more frequent are elections the greater the magnitude of these eﬀects as an
incumbent’s time-horizon is eﬀectively shortened. The sign of the impact on
aggregate consumption is ambiguous, as higher taxes reduce output but reduced
government spending reduces the crowding out of private consumption. The
steady-state rate of inflation is negative reflecting the nature of the inflationary-
bias problem facing policy makers - without negative inflation they would be
tempted to induce surprise reductions in inflation in order to increase the real
8A key to this result is that the each basket is comprised of the same goods. If we were to
assume that each basket drew on goods from diﬀerent sectors of the economy, each subject
to sticky prices, then fluctuations in the composition of government spending would lead to
aggregate fluctuations.
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value of debt inherited by their opponent.9
In Figure 3 we endogenise the probability of election victory, q(1) by as-
suming z1 = 0.9 and z2 = 0.1, while maintaining the assumption that elections
are typically held on a four year cycle, e = 1/16. This means that voters in
household 1 are more homogenous than the voters in household 2, which makes
the latter more prone to shift allegiance to the other party and tends to bias
the electoral success probability towards party 1. This asymmetric implemen-
tation is contrasted to the symmetric case where z1 = z2 = 0.5. In the latter
case there are no aggregate fluctuations since, in expectation, party 1’s voters
are just as likely to defect to party 2, as the other way round and the election
success probability remains q(1) = 1/2. In the asymmetric case the election
success probability is biased towards party 1, which means that party 2 is more
interested in disciplining party 1 than vice versa. As a result, party 2 issues
more debt than party 1 and we now observe fluctuations in aggregate variables.
Despite these fluctuations, the average debt level is lower than under the sym-
metric case. Additionally, in the asymmetric case, there are fluctuations in the
election success probability, such that q(1) is higher when party 1 is in power,
and vice versa. However, these endogenous fluctuations in the election success
probability are insignificant, relative to the levels shift and similar pictures could
have been drawn with an exogenous electoral success probability.
The fluctuations in economic aggregates, largely reflect changes in policy
when the incumbent loses oﬃce to the opposition. In this case, the electorally
strong party 1, upon winning an election, relaxes monetary policy which raises
consumption and inflation, reducing the real value of government debt. At the
same time, the party cuts tax rates moderating the inflationary impact of the
relaxation in monetary policy, but the lower tax rates are not suﬃcient to reverse
the lower debt implied by reduced debt service costs.
Figure 4 then outlines the stochastic steady-state as we vary the political
homogeneity of voters within each household, such that the average electoral
success probability for party 1, q(1), varies between 0 and 1. Here the deficit
bias is at a maximum when q(1) = 1/2 since this maximises electoral turnover.
As either parties’ probability of electoral success increases the need to tie the
hands of the other party falls. However, the desire to increase the steady-state
debt stock above the eﬃcient level chosen by the social planner remains as the
objective function of party 1 implies that they wish to reduce the consumption of
basket B more than they wish to increase the consumption of basket A such that
he wishes to reduce overall government spending. This means that even when
there is no strategic interaction between parties the wish to reduce aggregate
government spending is consistent with a higher debt stock. The pattern of
higher consumption and lower government spending, but without variation in
9 It is important to note that here monetary and fiscal policy are used jointly to achieve the
strategic and stabilisation goals of the policy makers. An interesting extension to the present
analysis would be to allow monetary policy to be set by an unelected policy maker with an
objective function consistent with social welfare, while fiscal policy remained in the hands of
heterogeneous political parties. This may aﬀect the nature of the inflationary bias observed
as an equilibrium in this model.
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tax rates and inflation, is suﬃcient to ensure this steady-state is time consistent.
Figure 4 also plots the steady-state levels of variables around which each
party would fluctuate if in power. These are calculated by imagining a party i
being permanently in power, but expecting to lose/regain power with probability
q(i) should an election be called. The figure reveals that debt is slightly higher
for the low electoral success party, which also tends to pursue lower consumption
and inflation as policy is tightened to raise debt. However, the eﬀect of very
large variations in the electoral success probability on debt is relatively small,
possibly explaining the empirical results of Lambertini (2009) who fails to find
that opinion poll data Granger causes fiscal deficits.
Figure 5 explores the same composition heterogeneity as a function of the
degree of price stickiness. Here there is still the desire to constrain the behaviour
of the other policy maker through increasing debt levels, but the nature of the
time inconsistency problem this induces changes. At low levels of price stickiness
surprise inflation is the most eﬀective means of achieving a desired debt level
with limited impact on other variables, such that the use of debt strategically
declines. In the limit, as we tend towards a flexible price economy, it would no
longer be possible to tie the hands of one’s opponent through the issuance of
nominal debt since surprise inflation could costlessly undo any such constraint.
At intermediate levels of price stickiness and assumed levels of steady-state debt,
manipulating real interest rates rather than fiscal instruments are more eﬀective
in controlling debt. Finally, when prices are highly sticky control of debt returns
to fiscal instruments as the output costs of varying interest rates become too
great.
We now turn to consider size heterogeneity in party preferences such that
χAi = χ
B
i =
5
9 and χ
A
j = χ
B
j =
3
9 i.e. party 1 desires ‘large’ government,
while party 2 prefers ‘small’. Figure 6 details the nature of the electoral cycle
this implies, with an exogenous election success probability, q(1) = 1/2 and
frequent,e = 1 and infrequent elections, e = 1/16, respectively. When elections
are frequent, the large government party runs a relatively lower debt than the
other party although it is still sub-optimally large. In order to reduce the debt,
party 1 relaxes monetary policy and increases taxes which leads to a surprise
jump in inflation thereby deflating the debt. The higher government spending
crowds out private consumption. When elections are less frequent, the size of
the fluctuations are greater, and the large government party actually reduces
government debt below its initial eﬃcient level.
Figure 7, endogenises the election success probability by setting z1 = 0.444
and z2 = 0.556 which implies that the average election success probability is
q(1) = 0.5. Here, unlike the case of composition heterogeneity, there are signif-
icant fluctuations in the election success probability. However, since elections
are relatively infrequent, this does not significantly aﬀect behaviour and the ag-
gregate fluctuations are similar to the case when the election success probability
is exogenous, q(1) = 1/2. Again, this is consistent with the empirical evidence
in Lambertini (2009).
Figure 8 fixes the size distortion at χA1 = χB1 =
5
9 and χ
A
2 = χB2 =
3
9 and
varies the homogeneity of voters within each household such that the electoral
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victory probability, q(1) varies between 0 and 1. Here if we increase the prob-
ability of party 1’s victory we get to a situation where steady-state debt is
actually reduced. Why? Party 1 desires large government which requires ad-
ditional resources. By reducing debt there is lower debt service costs allowing
the party to increase government spending. It is important to note that this
surplus doesn’t emerge at q(1) = 1/2 as party 2’s desire to reduce spending is
greater than party 1’s desire to increase it. Notice, from Figure 8 which plots
the steady-state around which each party would fluctuate, the ’large’ govern-
ment party 1 would also support the increased debt for electoral probabilities
q(1) < 0.45. Party 1 never wants to issue as much debt as 2, but doesn’t attempt
to completely reverse the policies of 2. There are two constraints on party 1
preventing them achieving the lower level of debt they would choose if perma-
nently in power - firstly, their current policy choices will depend upon inflation
and consumption expectations which partly depend upon the expected actions
of their opponents and, secondly, in a sticky-price environment, any attempt by
their opponent to undo the strategic use of debt will give rise to aggregate fluc-
tuations which are costly to the incumbent. This explains why the fluctuations
in debt across the parties are small relative to the overall deficit/surplus bias.
Figure 9 plots the stochastic steady-state of the economy with size hetero-
geneity in party preferences for government spending, against the degree of price
stickiness. There is an expected 4-year electoral cycle, e=1/16 and the densities
of the political preference shocks imply, z1 = z2 = 0.5. Here we can see that
when prices are near flexible steady-state deflation is very high to minimise the
further use of suprise inflation/deflation to manipulate the level of debt. While
when prices are very sticky, steady-state inflation is close to zero since the costs
of using significant inflation surprises to manipulate debt are simply too great.
- it is preferable to generate changes in the tax base to aﬀect fiscal revenues.
Here we can see that at intermediate levels of price stickiness, where real in-
terest rates are an eﬀective tool for manipulating government debt, the average
size of the debt stock and the size of the endogenous fluctuations in the election
success probability are greatest.
5.2 The Welfare Costs of the Deficit Bias, Electoral Cycle
and Shocks
Finally, we assess the welfare costs of introducing these electoral cycles to the
New Keynesian model. To do so we add productivity and mark-up shocks. The
productivity shock follows the following pattern,
at = ρaat−1 + ξt
where we adopt a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of ρa = 0.99
and a standard deviation of the productivity shock of σξ = 0.01. This is similar
to the productivity process in Ireland (2004), although he adopts a unit-root
process in technology which we render stationary as in Smets and Wouters
(2005). We adopt an iid mark-up shock with a standard deviation of 0.0175
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, where we have rescaled the persistent shock in Ireland (2004) to match the
unconditional variance of the mark-up process.
We then consider plausible degrees of composition and size heterogeneity to
assess the extent to which these generate costs in the New Keynesian model. The
evidence on such eﬀects is mixed - see, for example, the meta-analysis of Imbeau
et al. (2001) of studies which explore the link between the party composition of
government and policy outcomes. Therefore, in order to measure the possible
size of composition and size heterogeneities in a manner which would allow us to
calibrate our model, we examined data from US federal government spending10
broken down into spending components between 1970 and 2007, and scaled by
GDP. We then quadratically detrended this data and regressed the residuals
on a dummy based on the outcome of the presidential elections. The results
are given in Table 1. Here there are negligible party eﬀects on all categories
except for Defense and Total Health, where Republicans typically raise defence
spending by 0.785% of GDP relative to the level chosen by the Democrats, while,
in the case of health spending, Democrats tend to spend 0.24% of GDP more
than the Republicans.
10The data was taken from Table 3.1 of the Historical Tables of the US Budget for the
Fiscal Year 2009 and refers to ’Outlays by Superfunction and Function 1940-2013’, where the
data beyond 2007 are estimates.
23
Table 1 - Party Diﬀerences in Categories of Government Spending.
Category Coeﬃcient on Democrat Dummy t-ratio
Defense -0.7854 -3.3348*
Education 0.0522 1.0412
Total Health 0.2370 5.2125*
Transport -0.0032544 -0.163
Other -0.05841 -0.98071
While these results suggest that there is both a composition and size com-
ponent to heterogeneity in party preferences, given the wide range of conflicting
empirical evidence on this issue it is diﬃcult to reach a clear conclusion on the
exact size of these eﬀects. In light of this, we consider composition and size het-
erogeneity separately, with moderate measures of heterogeneity in both cases.
We adopt the following parameters when consider the composition heterogene-
ity, χA1 = χB2 =
416
900 and χ
A
2 = χB1 =
384
900 . This implies that party 1 will drive
spending on basket A 0.5% of GDP higher than party 2. Similarly, party 2 will
attempt to drive spending on basket B 0.5% of GDP higher than party 1. While
in the case of size heterogeneity we assume χA1 = χ
B
1 =
422
900 and χ
A
2 = χ
B
2 =
378
900 .
This then implies that party 1 will drive spending on baskets A and B 0.5% of
GDP higher than party 2.
We also set the weights in the election success probability equation equal to
z1 = z2 = 0.5. This implies an election success probability of roughly 0.5 under
both forms of political conflict, with a slight bias towards the ‘small’ government
party when considering size heterogeneity. This is in line with the average
relative popular vote shares of the Republican and Democrat candidates in US
presidential elections where, between 1948 and 2008, the relative vote shares are
51% and 49% for the Republican and Democratic candidates, respectively.
We noted above that the introduction of heterogeneity in party preferences
over government spending would tend to imply that parties utilised their least
preferred government spending basket more actively in responding to shocks.
Figure 10 gives the impulse response to a 1% technology shock with party 1 and
party 2 in power, respectively, where they diﬀer in their preferences over the
composition of government spending. The figure reveals that party 1 does move
spending on basket A by more in its initial response to the shock. However, the
size of the eﬀect is small. The response in the absence of political conflict is not
very diﬀerent. Figure 11 does the same, but with a size heterogeneity. In this
case, there are some diﬀerences across parties in terms of the impulse response
of all variables, but, again, these are not large.
These results are then reflected in Table 2 which gives the welfare costs of
shocks with and without diﬀerent types of political conflict. These costs are
measured as a percentage of steady-state consumption, which implies that the
costs of the technology and mark-up shocks in the absence of political conflict
are 0.092% of consumption. In contrast the costs of the electoral cycle alone
is 1% for a composition heterogeneity and 1.74% for size heterogeneity, when
elections occur every period and the election success probability is exogenously
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fixed at q(1) = 1/2. The relative size of these two eﬀects, reflects the fact that
composition heterogeneity, when q(1) = 1/2, only induces fluctuations in the
composition of government spending, while the size heterogeneity induces ad-
ditional fluctuations in other welfare relevant variables. However, in both cases
the dominant eﬀect is the levels shift induced by the deficit bias, the implied
inflation bias and the changes in policy variables to support the sub-optimally
high level of government debt. As could be seen from the impulse responses
to shocks, the sub-optimal response to shocks with political heterogeneity is
quantitatively small and has a negative, but negligible impact on welfare.
If we then allow for the fact that elections do not occur every quarter, but
occur on a typical four year cycle, then the costs of symmetrical composition
heterogeneity are slightly reduced, while the costs of the size heterogeneity rise
from 1.74% to 2.1% of steady-state consumption. This reflects the greater size
of fluctuations induced by the size heterogeneity when elections are infrequent,
as each party feels less constrained by the possibility that their opponent will
undo their policies at some subsequent date, since that possibility is likely to be
some time oﬀ.
Endogenising the election success probability does not significantly aﬀect the
welfare costs of the electoral cycle. It might be thought, that this was because
the parties may be reluctant to invest in electoral success when the probability
of there being an election in the next period was relatively small, e = 1/16.
However, if we assume that elections are held every period, then this does not
significantly aﬀect the costs of the electoral cycle under the size heterogeneity
(it would have no eﬀect under the composition heterogeneity). For this reason
we conjecture that introducing fixed term elections would not significantly aﬀect
our results.
Table 2 - Welfare Costs of Deficit Biases, Electoral Cycles and Economic Shocks11
Economic No Economic
Shocks Shocks
No Conflict 0.092% 0%
e = 1, Exogenous q(i) = 1/2 Composition Heterogeneity 1.103% 1.001%
Size Heterogeneity 1.839% 1.737%
e = 1/16, Exogenous q(i) = 1/2 Composition Heterogeneity 1.100% 1.001%
Size Heterogeneity 2.151% 2.055%
e = 1/16, Endogenous q(1): Composition Heterogeneity 1.100% 1.001%
z1 = z2 = 1/2 Size Heterogeneity 2.159% 2.050%
11Welfare is expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have combined two separate literatures - firstly, the New Key-
nesian analysis of monetary and fiscal policy which has typically assumed the
existence of a single benevolent policy maker, and secondly, the New Political
Economy analysis of political conflict over fiscal policy which has usually taken
place in the context of real economies. In combining these literatures we cre-
ated an environment where policy makers trade-oﬀ the use of instruments for
business cycle stabilisation purposes against the strategic use of policy to both
tie the hands of their political opponents and influence the endogenous outcome
of future elections.
Our first key result is that a significant and costly deficit bias can be gen-
erated in a sticky price New Keynesian economy with nominal debt. Previous
analysis of the deficit bias problem was based on the manipulation of real debt
in a real economy, since increases in nominal debt can be costlessly oﬀset by
surprise inflation in a flexible price economy. We demonstrate that empirically
plausible degrees of price stickiness are suﬃcient to ensure that nominal debt
can also be an eﬀective strategic variable.
Our second main result is that the electoral cycle that such behaviour gener-
ates gives rise to significant welfare costs, which greatly exceed those associated
with the technology and mark-up shocks traditionally used to drive business
cycles in New Keynesian models. Moreover, much of these costs, for example
the implied inflationary bias and the endogenous fluctuations in aggregate vari-
ables, are directly related to the existence of nominal inertia within an economy
subject to political conflict.
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Appendix 1 - Deriving Policy Objectives
(1) Flexible Price Equilibrium
Profit-maximising behaviour implies that firms will operate at the point at
which marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
− ln(μt) = mctµ
1− 1
t
¶
=
(1− κ)
(1− τ t)
(Nnt )
(ϕ)A−1t (C
n
t )
σξNt
In the initial steady-state this reduces to,µ
1− 1

¶
=
(1− κ)
(1− τ) (N
n
)ϕ(C
n
)σ
If the subsidy κ is given by
(1− κ) = (1− 1

)(1− τ)
then
(C
n
)−σ = (N
n
)ϕ
which is identical to the optimal level of employment in the eﬃcient steady-state.
Given the steady-state government spending rule,
G
Y
= (1 + (χA)−
1
σ + (χB)−
1
σ )−1
and,
G
A
G
= γ = [
µ
χA
χB
¶− 1σ
+ 1]−1
the steady-state level of output is given by,
Y = N = (1 + (χA)
1
σ + (χB)
1
σ )
σ
σ+ϕ
and, if the subsidy is in place, then the steady-state real wage is given by,
w =
1
1− τ
The steady-state tax rate required to support a given debt to GDP ratio is
given by,
τ =
(1− β)B
Y
+ G
Y
1 + (1− β)B
Y
+ G
Y
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and the tax revenues relative to debt this implies are given by,
wNτ
b
=
τ
1−τ
B
Y
This is enough to define all log-linearised relationships dependent on model
parameters and the initial debt to GDP ratio.
(2) Derivation of Welfare
Average household utility in period t is
(
C1−σt
1− σ +
1
2
(χAi + χ
A
j )
(GAt )
1−σ
1− σ +
1
2
(χBi + χ
B
j )
(GBt )
1−σ
1− σ −
Nt1+ϕξNt
1 + ϕ
)
Before considering the elements of the utility function we need to note the
following general result relating to second order approximations,
Yt − Y
Yt
= bYt + 1
2
bY 2t +O[2]
where bYt = ln(YtY ), O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in
the bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various
places in the derivation of welfare. Now consider the second order approximation
to the first term,
C1−σt
1− σ = C
1−σ
(
Ct − C
C
)− σ
2
C
1−σ
(
Ct − C
C
)2 + tip+O[2]
where tip represents ‘terms independent of policy’. Using the results above this
can be rewritten in terms of hatted variables,
C1−σt
1− σ = C
1−σ{ bCt + 1
2
(1− σ) bC2t }+ tip+O[2]
Similarly for the terms in government spending,
χA
(GAt )1−σ
1− σ = χ
A(G
A
)1−σ{ bGAt + 12(1− σ)( bGAt )2}+ tip+O[2]
χB
(GBt )1−σ
1− σ = χ
B(G
B
)1−σ{ bGBt + 12(1− σ)( bGBt )2}+ tip+O[2]
The final term in labour supply can be written as,
N1+ϕt ξ
N
t
1 + ϕ
= N
1+ϕ{ bNt + 1
2
(1 + ϕ) bN2t + bNtbξNt }+ tip+O[2]
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Now we need to relate the labour input to output and a measure of price
dispersion. Aggregating the individual firms’ demand for labour yields,
N = (
Y
A
)
Z 1
0
(
PH(i)
PH
)−tdi
It can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6) that
bN = bY − a+ ln[Z 1
0
(
P (i)
P
)−tdi]
= bY − a+ 
2
vari{p(i)}+O[2]
so we can write
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
= N
1+ϕ{bYt + 1
2
(1 + ϕ)bY 2t − (1 + ϕ)bYtat + 2vari{pt(i)}}
+tip+O[2]
Using these expansions, individual utility can be written as
Γt = C
1−σ{ bCt + 1
2
(1− σ) bC2t }
+χA(G
A
)1−σ{ bGAt + 12(1− σ)( bGAt )2}
+χB(G
B
)1−σ{ bGBt + 12(1− σ)( bGBt )2}
−N1+ϕ{bYt + 1
2
(1 + ϕ)bY 2t − (1 + ϕ)bYtat
+

2
vari{pt(i)}}
+tip+O[2]
Using second order approximation to the national accounting identity,
θ bCt = bYt − (1− θ) bGt − 1
2
θ bC2t − 12(1− θ) bG2t + 12 bY 2t +O[2]
and,
γ bGAt = bGt − (1− γ) bGBt − 12γ( bGAt )2 − 12(1− γ)( bGBt )2 + 12 bG2t +O[2]
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen
optimally, the following conditions hold in the initial steady-state,
C
1−σ
= N
1+ϕ
θ
and,
χA(G
A
)1−σ = N
1+ϕ
(1− θ)γ
χB(G
B
)1−σ = N
1+ϕ
(1− θ)(1− γ)
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Which allows us to eliminate the levels terms and rewrite welfare as,
Γt = C
1−σ{−1
2
σ bC2tt}+ χA(GA)1−σ{−12σ( bGAt )2}+ χB(GB)1−σ{−12σ( bGBt )2}
−N1+ϕ{1
2
ϕbY 2t − (1 + ϕ)bYtat + 2vari{pt(i)}}
+tip+O[2]
We now need to rewrite this in gap form using the focs for the social planner
to eliminate the term in the technology shock,
Γt = −N
1+ϕ 1
2
{σθ( bCt − bC∗t )2 + σ(1− θ)γ( bGAt − bGA∗t )2 + σ(1− θ)(1− γ)( bGBt − bGB∗t )2
+ϕ(bYt − bY ∗t )2 + vari{pt(i)}}+ tip+O[2]
Using the result from Woodford (2003) that
∞X
t=0
βtvari{pt(i)} = θ
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
∞X
t=0
βtπ2t + t.i.p+O[2]
we can write the discounted sum of utility as,
Γ = −N1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{σθ( bCt − bC∗t )2 +σ(1− θ)γ( bGAt − bGA∗t )2 + σ(1− θ)(1− γ)( bGBt − bGB∗t )2
+ϕ(bYt − bY ∗t )2 + λπ2t} +tip+O[2]
(3) The budget constraint using gap variables
The log-linearised budget constraint is given by,bbt − πt − σ bCt = βbbt+1 − βEt{πt+1 + σ bCt+1}
+
wNτ
b
( bwt + bNt + bτ t)− G
b
bGt − σ(1− β) bCt
Using the labour supply function to eliminate real wages and the definition of
eﬃcient output to eliminate the technology shock,bbt − πt − σ bCt = βbbt+1 − βEt{πt+1 + σ bCt+1}
−σ(1− β) bCt − G
b
bGt
+
wNτ
b
((1 + ϕ)(bYt − bY ∗t ) + 11− τ bτ t + σ( bCt − bC∗t ) + bY ∗t )
Gapping the remaining variables and combining shock terms,bbt − πt − σ( bCt − bC∗t ) = βEt{bbt+1 − πt+1 − σ( bCt+1 − bC∗t+1)}− ft
−σ(1− β)( bCt − bC∗t )− Gb ( bGt − bG∗t )
+
wNτ
b
((1 + ϕ)(bYt − bY ∗t ) + 11− τ (bτ t − bτ∗t ) + σ( bCt − bC∗t ))
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where
ft = −(σ(1− βρa) + (1− σ)(1− β))
(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
at −
wN
b
μt
captures the fiscal consequences of the various shocks hitting the economy.
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Appendix 2 - Time Consistent Policy with Tar-
gets and Electoral Uncertainty
(1) Deriving the Bellman equation
The first problem we face is in formulating a recursive problem when our
model contains expectations of the future value of variables, in particular con-
sumption, Etc
g
t+1 and inflation, Etπt+1. However, since we have a linear-
quadratic form for our problem we can hypothesize a solution for these en-
dogenous variables of the form, conditional on party i being the incumbent,
Et−1(c
g
t | i) =G0i +G1iSt−1
Et−1(πt | i) = F0i +F1iSt−1 (15)
where G0i = [g0i], G1i =
£
g1i g2i g3i
¤
and F0i = [f0i] and F1i =£
f1i f2i f3i
¤
are two 1x3 vectors of undefined constants and St−1 =⎡
⎣
bbt
at−1
μt−1
⎤
⎦ is the vectors of state variables. Note that in forming these expecta-
tions economic agents do not know who is going to be in power, however they
do know who the incumbent is, the exogenous probability that there will be an
election, e, and the probability that party i will win that election, q(i) and the
corresponding probability that party j, i 6= j, will win, q(j) = 1 − q(i). Un-
less elections occur in every period, there is an electoral advantage to being an
incumbent such that we must condition the expectations on who is incumbent
at the time the expectations are formed. The constants reflect the influence of
the parties’ targets on expectations of future policy independent of the current
state of the economy, but conditional on who is the incumbent at the time the
expectations are formed.
Using the former of these we can write the equations describing the evolution
of the state variables12 as conditional on the assumption that party i is currently
in power,
B0Sit = B1St−1 +B2u
i
t +B3ξt +B4
i
B0i =
⎡
⎣
B0i1,1 B0i1,2 B0i1,3
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎤
⎦ ,
where B0i1,1 = β − σβg1i, B0i1,2 = (σ(1− ρaβ)− (σ − 1)(1− β))
(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
− σβg2i
and B0i1,3 =
wNτ
b
− σβg3i.
12 In this section we make the empirically plausible assumption that debt is denominated in
nominal terms.
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B1 =
⎡
⎣
1 0 0
0 ρa 0
0 0 ρμ
⎤
⎦ , B2 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
B21,1 B21,1 B21,3 B21,4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
B3 =
⎡
⎣
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎤
⎦ and B4i =
⎡
⎣
σβg0i
0
0
⎤
⎦
where B21,1 =
(ϕθ + σ)(−(1 + λ)B
Y
− (1− θ))− θ(1− θ)− (1− β)θB
Y
+ βϕθB
Y
B
Y
,
B21,2 =
(−(2− θ)− (1− β + λ)B
Y
)((1− β)B
Y
+ (1− θ))
B
Y
and,
B21,3 =
((1 + ϕ)(θ − (1− β)B
Y
)− ϕ(1 + λB
Y
))(1− θ)γ
B
Y
B21,4 =
((1 + ϕ)(θ − (1− β)B
Y
)− ϕ(1 + λB
Y
))(1− θ)(1− γ)
B
Y
uit =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bτ it − bτ∗tbCit − bC∗tbGAit − bGA∗tbGBit − bGB∗t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ is the vector of control variables in gap form and ξt is
a vector of iid shocks to our shock processes. This allows us to rewrite the
equation of motion for the state variables as,
Sit = D0
i +D1iSt−1 +D2
iuit +D3
iξt (16)
where
D0i =
£
B0i
¤−1
B4i
D1i =
£
B0i
¤−1
B1
D2i =
£
B0i
¤−1
B2
D3i =
£
B0i
¤−1
B3
Similarly we can write the evolution of inflation as follows,
Etπt+1 = A1πit +A2u
i
t (17)
where
A1 =
∙
1
β
¸
and,
A2 =
h
−λ(ϕθ+σ)β −
λ((1−β)B
Y
+(1−θ))
β −
λϕ(1−θ)γ
β −
λϕ(1−θ)(1−γ)
β
i
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Leading equation (15) forward one period and utilising the equation describing
the evolution of the state variables, we can write,
F0i +F1iD0i +F1iD1iSt−1 +F1
iD2iuit + F1
iD3iξt = A1π
i
t +A2u
i
t
Solving for inflation,
πit = C0
i +C1iSt−1 +C2
iuit +C3
iξt
where
C0i = [A1]−1[F1iD0i+F0i]
C1i = [A1]−1[F1iD1i]
C2i = −[A1]−1[A2−F1iD2i]
C3i = [A1]
−1
[F1iD3i]
These allow us to derive the optimisation of policymaker i as follows,
V i(St−1; ξt) =Min
uit
(πitRπ
i
t + (u
i
t −ui∗t )0Qi(uit −ui∗t ) + βEtCi(Sit; ξt+1)) (18)
subject to,
πit = C0
i +C1iSt−1 +C2
iuit +C3
iξt
Sit = D0
i +D1iSt−1 +D2
iuit +D3
iξt
and if party j is out of power,
W j(St−1; ξt) = (π
i
tR
jπit + (u
i
t − u
j∗
t )
0Qj(uit − u
j∗
t )) + βEtC
j(Sit; ξt+1)
where St−1 =
⎡
⎣
bbt
at−1
μt−1
⎤
⎦ , uit =
⎡
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bτ it − bτ∗tbCit − bC∗tbGAit − bGA∗tbGBit − bGB∗t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ and u
i∗
t = u
i∗ +KiSt are the
vectors of state and control variables respectively. While ξt is a vector of iid
innovations to the model’s shock processes and ui∗t is the vector of party-specific
target variables defined as,
ui∗ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
C
Ti
G
ATi
G
BTi
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ and
⎡
⎢⎣
C
Ti
G
ATi
G
BTi
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎣
2ZCi Z
CA
i Z
CB
i
ZCAi 2Z
A
i Z
AB
i
ZCBi Z
AB
i 2Z
B
i
⎤
⎦
−1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0
2ΩAi
(χAi −χA)
χA−χAi (1−σ)
2ΩBi
(χBi −χB)
χB−χBi (1−σ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Ki =
∙
0 0 0eKi
¸
eKi =
⎡
⎣
2ZCi Z
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i Z
CB
i
ZCAi 2Z
A
i Z
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i
ZCBi Z
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i 2Z
B
i
⎤
⎦
−1
⎡
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0 0 0
0 2ΩAi
(χAi −χA)(1−σ)
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1+ϕ
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0 2ΩBi
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⎤
⎥⎥⎦
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Notice that the targets are given by,
ui∗t = u
i∗ +KiSt
however, the Ki matrix only implies a dependence of the target variables on the
exogenous shock processes. Accordingly we can rewrite the targets as,
ui∗t = u
i∗ +K1iSt−1 +K3
iξt
where K1i =Ki
⎡
⎣
0 0 0
0 ρa 0
0 0 ρμ
⎤
⎦ and K3i =Ki.
(2)The Form of the Continuation Game
Given that the problem is linear-quadratic the value function for player i,
V i(St−1; ξt) and the discounted pay-oﬀs if he is out of power, W i(St−1; ξt) are
given by,
V i(St−1; ξt) = Φ0
i +Φ1iSt−1 + S0t−1Φ2
iSt−1 +Φ3iξt + S
0
t−1Φ4
iξt + ξ
0
tΦ5
iξt
W i(St−1; ξt) = μ0
i + μ1iSt−1 + S0t−1μ2
iSt−1 + μ3iξt + S
0
t−1μ4
iξt + ξ
0
tμ5
iξt
where ΦJi and μJi with J = 0, 1, 2 are matrices of unknown coeﬃcients for
player i’s value and payoﬀ functions. However, the value of the continuation
game, not only directly depends on these payoﬀs, but also indirectly through
their impact on the probability of election victory. Since we are focusing on
linear strategies we need only consider a 2nd order approximation to the con-
tinuation game,
EtCi(S
j
t ; ξt+1) = β0
i|j + β1i|jSt + S0tβ2
i|jSt +O[2]
where i indicates from which party’s perspective we are evaluating the continua-
tion game, j denotes who is setting policy, O[2] refers to terms which are greater
than second order and,
β0i|j =
1
2
efΦ0i + (1− 1
2
e)fμ0i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
β0i|i = (1− 1
2
e)fΦ0i + 1
2
efμ0i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
β1i|j =
1
2
eΦ1i + (1− 1
2
e)μ1i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ1i − fμ1i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢
)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
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β1i|i = (1− 1
2
e)Φ1i +
1
2
eμ1i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ1i − fμ1i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢
)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
β2i|j =
1
2
eΦ2i + (1− 1
2
e)μ2i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ2i − fμ2i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ2i − μ2i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ2j − μ2j
¢
)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢0
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢0
)(Φ1i − μ1i)
β2i|i = (1− 1
2
e)Φ2i +
1
2
eμ2i
+e(−zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)(fΦ2i − fμ2i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ2i − μ2i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ2j − μ2j
¢
)(fΦ0i − fμ0i)
+e(−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢0
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢0
)(Φ1i − μ1i)
where fΦ0i = Φ0i + tr[ΣΦ5i] and fμ0i = μ0i + tr[Σμ5i] . In other words,
the second order approximation to the continuation game takes account of the
impact of debt (and other state variables) on both the expected pay-oﬀs to each
party when in and out of power, but also factors in the repercusions of this for
the probability of electoral success.
The incumbent policymaker therefore takes account of the impact a marginal
increase in debt has on the value of the continuation game,
∂EtCi(Sit; ξt+1)
∂Sit
= β1i|i0 + (β2i|i0 + β2i|i)Sit
where the debt aﬀects not only the payoﬀs when each party is in or out of power,
but, as a consequence, also the probability of each party winning any election
that takes place.
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Appendix 3 - Solving the Bellman equation
(1)The first-order conditions conditional on ‘guesses’
The first-order conditions with respect to the control variables chosen by
policy maker i from solving (18) are then given by,
2C2i0Rπit + (Q
i +Qi0)(uit − ui∗t ) + βD2i0
∂EtCi(Sit; ξt+1)
∂Sit
= 0
Using the definition of the targets for player i, ui∗t = u
i∗+K1iSt−1+K3
iξt we
can write this as,
2C2i0Rπit+(Q
i+Qi0)(uit−ui∗−K1iSt−1−K3iξt)+βD2i0
∂EtCi(Sit; ξt+1)
∂Sit
= 0
Using the equation of motion the vector of state variables, the relationship
between inflation and state variables and the ‘guess’ for the value of the contin-
uation game, this can be written as,
2C2i0R[C0i +C1iSt−1 +C2iuit +C3
iξt]
+(Qi +Qi0)(uit − ui∗ −K1iSt−1 −K3iξt])
+βD2i0[β1i|i0 + (β2i|i0 + β2i|i)[D0i +D1iSt−1 +D2iuit +D3
iξt]]
= 0
and solved for control variables,
uit=− [U2i]
−1
U0i − [U2i]−1U1iSt−1 − [U2i]−1U3iξt
where
U0i = 2C2i0RC0i − (Qi +Qi0)ui∗ + βD2i0[β1i|i0 + (β2i|i0 + β2i|i)D0i]
U1i = [2C2i0RC1i − (Qi +Qi0)K1i + βD2i0(β2i|i0 + β2i|i)D1i]
U2i = [2C2i0RC2i + (Qi +Qi0) + βD2i0(β2i|i0 + β2i|i)D2i]
U3i = [2C2i0RC3i − (Qi +Qi0)K3i + βD2i0(β2i|i0 + β2i|i)D3i]
The solution for inflation is now given as,
πit = P0
i +P1iSt−1 +P3
iξt
where,
P0i = C0i −C2i[U2i]−1U0i
P1i = C1i −C2i[U2i]−1U1i
P3i = C3i −C2i[U2i]−1U3i
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(2)Equating the Undetermined Coeﬃcients in the Forecasting
Equations
We are now in a position to obtain our first set of equations to solve for
the forecast guess parameters. Taking expectations of the optimal relationship
between the controls and state variables, conditional on party i being in power,
Et−1(ut | i) = q(i | i)tEt−1uit + q(j | i)tEt−1ujt
= gG0i +gG1iSt−1
where,
gG0i = −[1− e+ e(1
2
− zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)][U2i]−1U0i
−[e(1
2
+ zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´− zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)][U2j ]−1U0j
and
gG1i = −[1− e+ e(1
2
− zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)][U2i]−1U1i
−[e(1
2
+ zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´− zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)][U2j ]−1U1j
−e([U2i]−1U0i − [U2j ]−1U0j)[−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢
]
The second row of this relationship can then be equated to the guess para-
meters in
Et−1(c
g
t | i) =G0i +G1iSt−1
Similarly, we can take expectations of the expression for inflation to obtain,
Et−1[πt | i] = q(i | i)tEt−1πit + q(j | i)tEt−1πjt
= fP0i + fP1iSt−1
where
fP0i = [1− e+ e(1
2
− zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)]P0i
+[e(
1
2
+ zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´− zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)]P0j
and
fP1i = [1− e+ e(1
2
− zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´+ zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)]P1i
+[e(
1
2
+ zi
³fΦ0i − fμ0i´− zj ³fΦ0j − fμ0j´)]P1j
+e(P0i − P0j)[−zi
¡
Φ1i − μ1i
¢
+ zj
¡
Φ1j − μ1j
¢
)]
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which can then be equated with the elements in,
Et−1(πt | i) = F0i +F1iSt−1
(3)Equating the Undetermined Coeﬃcients in the Continuation
Game
It is helpful to write the evolution of the vector of state variables.
Sit = D0
i +D1iSt−1 +D2
iuit +D3
iξt
= J0i + J1iSt−1 + J3
iξt
where
J0i = D0i −D2i[U2i]−1U0i
J1i = D1i −D2i[U2i]−1U1i
J3i = D3i −D2i[U2i]−1U3i
Using the definition,
ui∗t = u
i∗ +K1iSt−1 +K3
iξt
It is convenient to define,
uit − u
j∗
t =
gU0ij +gU1ijSt−1 +gU3ijξt
where gU0ij = −[[U2i]−1U0i + uj∗]gU1ij = −[[U2i]−1U1i +K1j]gU3ij = −[[U2i]−1U3i +K3j]
We now need to find expressions to solve for the ‘guessed’ parameterisation
of the continuation game.
EtCi(Sit; ξt+1) = β0
i|i + β1i|iSjt + S
j0
t β2
i|iSjt
= β0i|i + β1i|iJ0i + J0i0β2i|iJ0i
[β1i|iJ1i + J0i0(β2i|i + β2i|i
0
)J1i]St−1
+S0t−1J1
i0β2i|iJ1iSt−1 + tis+O[2]
where tis denotes non-constant terms independent of the vector of state vari-
ables. Similarly we can define the value of the continuation game for party i
given that party j has been in power,
EtCi(S
j
t ; ξt+1) = β0
i|j + β1i|jSjt + S
j0
t β2
i|jSjt
= β0i|j + β1i|jJ0j + J0j 0β2i|jJ0j
[β1i|jJ1j + J0j0(β2i|j + β2i|j0)J1j ]St−1
+S0t−1J1
j0β2i|jJ1jSt−1 + tis+O[2]
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Using these results the Bellman equation can be rewritten as,
V i(St−1; ξt) = P0
i0RP0i +gU0ii0QigU0ii + β(β1i|i + β1i|iJ0i + J0i0β2i|iJ0i)
[P0i0(R+R0)P1i]St−1 + S0t−1P1
i0RP1iSt−1
+[gU0ii0(Qi +Qi0)gU0ii]St−1 + S0t−1gU1ii0QigU1iiSt−1
+β[β1i|iJ1i + J0i0(β2i|i + β2i|i0)J1i]St−1 + βS0t−1J1
i0β2i|iJ1iSt−1
+tis++O[2]
The pay-oﬀs for a party out of power can be written as,
W i(St−1; ξt) = P0
j0RP0j +gU0ji0QigU0ji + β(β0i|j + β1i|jJ0j + J0j 0β2i|jJ0j)
[P0j0(R+R0)P1j ]St−1 + S0t−1P1
j0RP1jSt−1
+[gU0ji0(Qi +Qi0)gU1ji]St−1 + S0t−1gU1ji0QigU1jiSt−1
+β[β1i|jJ1j + J0j0(β2i|j + β2i|j0)J1j ]St−1 + βS0t−1J1
j0β2i|jJ1jSt−1
+tis+O[2]
These can then be equated with the corresponding terms from the value
function guesses,
V i(St−1; ξt) = fΦ0i +Φ1iSt−1 + S0t−1Φ2iSt−1 + tis
W i(St−1; ξt) = fμ0i + μ1iSt−1 + S0t−1μ2iSt−1 + tis where i = 1, 2
which completes the description of optimal policy for both parties.
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Expectations of Period t Formed 
and Policy Implemented
Election Draw
No Election Voter Preference Shocks Drawn
Voting
Incumbent in Power Opposition in Power
Economic Shocks Drawn
Expectations of Period t+1 Formed 
and Policy Implemented
Time t begins
Time t+1 begins
Figure 1: Timing of Events
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Figure 2: Impulse responses under composition heterogeneity and an electoral
cycle.
Notes to Figure - solid blue line - election probability e=1/16; green dashed
line - election probability e=1.
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Figure 3: Impulse response with composition heterogeneity and an electoral
cycle.
Notes to Figure - solid blue line, asymmetrical probabilistic voting, z1 = 0.9,
z2 = 0.1; green dashed line, symmetrical probabilistic voting, z1 = z2 = 0.5.
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Figure 4: Steady-State with composition heterogeneity as function of (endoge-
nous) election probability.
Notes to Figure - Stochastic steady-state - solid blue line; party 1 steady-
state - green line with stars; and, party 2 steady-state - red line with hollow
circles.
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Figure 5: Steady-state with composition heterogeneity as a function of degree
of price stickiness.
Notes to Figure - Stochastic steady-state - solid blue line; party 1 steady-
state - green line with stars; and, party 2 steady-state - red line with hollow
circles.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses under size heterogeneity and an electoral cycle.
Notes to Figure - solid blue line, election probability e = 1/16; green dashhed
line, election probability e = 1.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses with size heterogeneity and an electoral cycle.
Notes to Figure - solid blue line, endogenous election victory probability;
green dashhed line, exogenous election victory probability, q(i)=1/2.
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Figure 8: Steady-state with size heterogeneity as function of the (endogenous)
electoral probability.
Notes to Figure - Stochastic steady-state - solid blue line; party 1 steady-state
- green line with stars; and, party 2 steady-state - red line with hollow circles.
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Figure 9: Steady-state with size heterogeneity as a function of the degree of
price stickiness.
Notes to Figure - Stochastic steady-state - solid blue line; party 1 steady-
state - green line with stars; and, party 2 steady-state - red line with hollow
circles.
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Figure 10: Impulse response to 1% technology shock with compositional het-
erogeneity.
Notes to Figure - green line with stars party 1’s response, red line with hollow
circles i party 2’s response.
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Figure 11: Impulse response to 1% technology shock with size heterogeneity.
Notes to Figure - green line with stars party 1’s response, red line with hollow
circles party 2’s response.
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